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This paper explores the role of complementarities and
coordination failure in economic growth. We analyze the
evolution composed of a countable set of infinitely-lived
heterogenous industries. Individual industries exhibit
nonconvexities in production and are linked across time through
localized technological complementarities. Each industry employs
one of two production techniques. One technique is more
efficient in using capital than the other, but requires the
payment of a fixed capital cost. Both techniques exhibit
technological complementarities in the sense that the
productivity of capital invested in a technique is a function of
the technique choices made by various industries the previous
period. These complementarities, when strong enough, interact
with incompleteness of markets to produce multiple Pareto-
rankable equilibria in ling run economic activity. The
equilibria have a simple probabilistic structure that
demonstrates how localized coordination failures can affect the
aggregate equilibrium. The model is capable of generating
interesting aggregate dynamics as coordination problems become
the source of aggregate volatility. Modifications of the model









The large differences in both per capita output levels andgrowth ratesacross
countries have recently become the focus of considerable research in macroeconomics.
Much of this interest stems from the implications of different national experiences for
modelling macroeconomic aggregates as devolving from a dynamic general equilibrium
framework. A hallmark of the stochastic growth model pioneered by Brock and Mirman
[1972] is the convergence of economies with identical sets of preferences and production to
a unique limiting distribution for a wide array of initial conditions. Yet many analyses of
long run output movements (see Romer [1986], DeLong [1988], Quah [1990], and Bernard
and Durlauf (1990], among others) have concluded that divergence is in fact the norm.
One approach to this stylized fact is of course to argue that countries possess sufficiently
heterogeneous microeconomic characteristics that long run behavior is heterogeneous as
welt.Jones and Manuelli [1990], for example, show that if the marginal product of
capital is sufficiently large over all possible capital/labor ratios, then different
specifications of microeconomic parameters such as tax rates, production functions or
rates of time preference can lead to divergence of growth rates in a competitive general
equilibrium framework. However, most economists seem confident that differences in per
capita output levels and growth rates are too vast to be attributed to differences in
microeconomic parameters alone.Reinforced by the view that these disparities are
Pareto rankable, the bulk of theoretical work on divergence has looked for deviations
from the Arrow-Debren model.
One approach to explaining divergence has relied on modifications of the
standard growth model to account for increasing returns to scale as a source of multiple
steady states. Romer [1986), Lucas [1988] and Azariadis and Drazen [1990] have argued
that various forms of social increasing returns to scale can lead to a divergence between
the social and private marginal products of human and physical capital and lead to
multiple growth paths. Romer models the individual firm production function as being
1positively affected by the levelof the aggregate capitalstock in the economy. The
aggregate stock proxies for a host of production complementarities between individual
producers such as unpatentable innovations. As a result, a given marginal product of
capital is compatible with two different levels of capital, leading to multiple equilibria.
The possibility that multiple equilibria exist for aggregate activity has been
explored in a number of other formulations of market failure. The effects of incomplete
markets are analyzed in Diamond (1982], where multiplicity occurs due to the
externalities associated with search. IJeller (1986, 1990]derivessimilar results through
imperfect competition. In his model, firms act as Cournot oligopolists. Because of the
feedback of production into aggregate demand, marginal revenue and marginal cost can
intersect at several different levels of output.More generally, models of this type
emphasize the role of complementarities across firms and consumers in determining
average economic activity. Strong complementarities can lead the aggregate economy to
a Pareto inferior equilibrium because of coordination failure.
Increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition have been linked to
multiple equilibria, with emphasis on long run development, in recent work by Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny [1989]. These authors show that increasing returns can lead to
multiple equilibria when production decisions by monopolistic firms are constrained by
the extent of market demand. Low and high output equilibria are both possible due to
aggregate demand spillovers across all parts of the economy which are created by
production in each sector. These different steady states allow low per capita income
levels to be interpreted as a manifestation of coordination failure.
One problem in thinking about most coordination failure models as metaphors
for aggregate activity is that they are limited by the absence of any stochastic dynamics.
These models typically exhibit several constant steady states. The level of long run
activity, however, is entirely determined by the initial conditions of the model. No role
exists for transition dynamics in the selection of or movements across steady states.
Further, most coordination failure models cannot address the question of cycles in
2aggregate activity. (See Diamond and Fudenberg [1989] for an exception.)
This paper is designed to construct an explicitly dynamic and stochastic model of
coordination failure with a focus on the mechanisms by which growth evolves. We work
with a variant of the l3rock-Mirman economy. The economy consists of a countable
number of infinitely-lived, profit maximizing industries. Consumers are risk neutral.
Technological complementarities create intertemporal linkages between the production
functions of each sector, in ways similar to social increasing returns models. When these
cornplementarities are strong enough, coordination failure can occur which affects long
run growth.
Methodologically, we follow an approach to stochastic coordination problems
developed in Durlauf [1990a]. The basic idea is to interpret an aggregate equilibrium as a
jointprobability measure characterizing many agents. The microeconomic
characterization of an individual agent is treated as equal to the specification ofa
probability measure over the agent's actions conditional upon the rest of the economy.
The existence of an equilibrium is correspondingly equivalent to the existence of a joint
probability measure consistent with the microeconomically generated conditional
measures. Uniqueness of the equilibrium occurs whenever the conditional probability
measures can generate only one joint measure. When a class of conditional probability
measures is consistent with multiple joint measures, the stochastic process is said to be
nonergodic. This characterization of coordination problems as the relationship between
conditional and joint probability measures provides a natural framework for discussing
endogenous evolution towards steady states, as infinite-dimensional stochastic processes
can be modelled as the limits of finite-dimensional stochastic processes with different
initial and terminal conditions. AL the same time, by modelling theeconomy as a
stochastic process, it is straightforward to generate nontrivial time series properties for
aggregate output.
The dynamic behavior of our aggregate economy possesses two interesting
properties.First, the complementarities in the model act as a source of volatility in
3output across both industries and time. Intuitively, complementarities in behavior mean
that changes in the decisions of one agent spill over and alter the constraint sets of other
agents in ways different fromtheeffects which occur in a competitive equilibrium model.
High production in one industry induces high production in other industries through the
technological complementarities.This type of stochastic volatility is driven by
fundamentals and thus contrasts with results showing how incomplete markets can
generate sunspots.
Second, the transition probabilities describing how industries react to
complementarities create the potential for multiple long run equilibria. If industries are
sufficiently sensitive to the production decisions of others, in the sense that high
production by a given industry will occur with very low probability in the absence of high
production of others, then the economy will exhibit two long run equilibria.It is
standard in the coordination failure models that complementarities can lead to
multiplicity. (See Cooper and John [1988] for an excellent discussion of the static case.)
The current framework differs from most other models by describing this multiplicity as
the outcome of a dynamic process and by permitting transition dynamics between
equilibria. In addition, our model permits multiplicity to coexist with heterogeneity in
the behavior of individual agents. Multiple equilibria will not imply that all agents are
simultaneously producing at the high or low level.
In terms of understanding growth mechanisms, our model gives a primary role to
two factors.First, strong local linkages across industries can create sequential
complementarities which build up over time to affect aggregate behavior. Strong local
linkages mean that expansion in one sector will increase the conditional probability that a
finite number of additional sectors will expand. Collectively, these effects can lead to
aggregate growth. Second, leading sectors can induce takeoff in economic development.
Leading sectors are defined as industries that trade with all other industries and hence
whose expansion can cause economy-wide complementarities. Growth in these sectors,
due to technical change or other factors, can have far reaching effects. In particular, if
4leading sectors grow and provide services at lower cost to the rest of the economy, the
conditional probability structure of microeconomic production decisions will shift toward
choosing high production with greater frequency. This shift can, through the strong local
complementarities, induce a takeoff to growth.
Our results contrast with the Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny model of industrialization,
whose antecedent is the big push model of Rosenstein-Rodan [1943]. In big push theories,
industrialization occurs through the simultaneous movement of many sectors. In our
model, higher production in a given sector generates complementarities over a finite
subset of other sectors. however, because these ranges of complementarities overlap, all
sectors are eventually linked. I{ence growth can proceed through the sequential expansion
of different parts of the economy. Interestingly, our model roughly corresponds to a
major competitor of the big push school of industrialization policy: the Hirschman model
of economic development through the promotion of leading sectors with strong linkages to
industries throughout the economy. In Hirschman's framework, economic development
emerges as growth of some sectors spills over to cause growth in other sectors through
many different supply and demand links. Different parts of an economy can thus develop
at different rates, eventually leading to aggregate expansion. As in our model, Hirschman
argues that leading sectors can stimulate aggregate growth through simultaneous
interaction with many industries at once which then stimulate the many intertemporal
linkages in production.
Section 2 of this paper sets up a simple economic environment embodying
localized complementarities. The economy consists of a countable set of interacting
industries, each facing a nonconvexity in production. The solution to individual firm
capital accumulation problems and existence of the aggregate equilibrium are analyzed.
Section 3 discusses conditions for multiple equilibria. In Section 4, the cyclical behavior
of the economy is explored through simulations. Section 5 analyzes the role of leading
sectors in generating a takeoff from one equilibrium to another. Section 6 provides
summary and conclusions. A Technical Appendix follows which outlines some of the
5mathematics and contains proofs of the various theorems in the text.
2. Amodelof interacting industries
We consider a countable set of infinitely lived industries indexed by I. Time is
discrete. The economy may be thought of as the limit of an increasing sequence of
economies composed of finite numbers of industries.Each industry consists of a
continuum of identical firms. This specification permits us to treat the industries as
individual agents and at the same time ignore strategic considerations in their production
decisions. Specifically, the distinction between firms and industries is made to justify
assuming that industries act competitively with respect to complementarities. Each firm
takes the behavior of its own and other industries as given when making production
decisions. All firms produce a homogeneous good; industries are distinguished by distinct
production functions rather than distinct outputs. Following the standard Brock-Mirman
formulation, the homogeneous final good may either be consumed or converted to a
capital good which fully depreciates after one period. Aggregate output 1', consumption
C,andcapital Kobey
= c,+x,. (2.1)
These aggregates are computed by summing over all firms and consumers at each i.
Given our assumptions on internal industry structure, industry behavior is
proportional to the behavior of a representative firm which chooses a capital stock
sequence {K,)tomaximize the present discounted value of profits ll
I = E( p,÷a(+3—K11+a)Iff). (2.2)
}' equals the output of the i'th industry's representative firm at 1; P equals the date
6zero price of output at t (the price of output available at tin terms of the price of output
available at time 0); Wdenotesall information available to the economy at the
beginning of t. Each industry's representative firm has an initial endowment of output
which can be used as capital.
Consumers in the economy are risk neutral.Consumer r evaluates the
consumption stream {Crt}throughthe utility function
Urt= E(E Ptrt+j I ff3. (2.3)
All firms are owned by the consumers.All uninvested output is paid out as real
dividends. As we shall see, in equilibrium, total dividends payments exactly equal
consumption for each consumer.
Aggregate behavior is determined by the interactions of many heterogeneous
industries employing nonconvex technologies. Production occurs with a one period lag;
firms at 1—1 employ both one of two production techniques and a level of capital to
determine output at t. Only one technique may be used at a time. Cooper (1987) and
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [19891 exploit similar technologies to analyze multiple
equilibria; Milgrom and Roberts [1990] discuss how this type of nonconvexity can arise as
firms internally coordinate many complementary activities.The technique-specific
production functions produce Y1 and '2,i.through
y1,1l,t= fi(K1.1_1—F,(,t_i) (2.4)
'2,i,t= f2('i,I—I,1,t—1) (2.5)
and are industry-specific productivity shocks and Fisan overhead capital cost.
andare elements of ff.Recallingthat firms within an industry are identical, we
define w1 whkh equals 1 if technique 1 is used by industry iatt, 0 otherwise;
7= {...w1_i g,w1t,w1÷it...) whichequals the joint set of techniques employed at 2; and
={...w 1,w}which equals the history of technique choices up to 1.The entire
history of technique choices can be indexed by 2,thetwo-dimensional lattice of integers.
We place several restrktions on these technologies. First, each, technique fulfills
standard curvature conditions. Further, we associate technique 1 with high production.
Specifically, net capital NE'11, which equals K,—Ffortechnique 1 and K11 for
technique 2, has a strictly higher marginal (and by implication total) product when used
with technique 1 than technique 2.
Assumption 2.1. Restrictions on technique-specific production functions
Forallrealizations of (it' and 11K,fi(NK,(1) and f2(NK,q1) are twice-
differentiablefunctions suchthat
A.f1(0,ç1) _f2(0,hIIa = 0.
8f1(NK,(11)>0f2(NK,t711) 82f1(NK,ç1) 82f2(NK,i11)< •811K -, 811K—,
011K2—,
0/11(2—.






Bothtechniques exhibit technological complernentarities, as the history of
realized activity determines the parameters of the production function at 1. Romer's
11986] model of social increasing returns shares this feature. Our complementarities differ
from Romer's in two respects. First, all complementaritiesare local as the production
function of each firm is affected by the production decisions ofa finite number of
industries. The index i orders industries by similarity in technology;spillovers occur only
8between similar technologies. A large body of research in economic history has described
the importance of local complementarities in the evolution of technical innovations.'
Second, our complementarities are explicitly dynamic. Past production decisions affect
current productivity, which captures the idea of learning-by-doing as described by Arrow
(1952].
Specifically, we model the complementarities through the dependence of C1, and
on the history of industry technique choices. This means, in a learning-by-doing
context, that knowledge accumulation is a function of time spent on an activity, as
opposed to scale. This seems appropriate if the efficiency of the fixed capital cost of
technique 1, which we treat as devoted to organization and administration of production,
is more likely to improve due to accumulation of knowledge than the efficiency of
variable capital. Since firms in an industry are identical, the industry technique choice
represents a measure of total time devoted to a particular industry-specific technique.
Complementarities are assumed to be the only source of dependence across shocks.
y) denotes the conditional probability measure of r given information y z(g) denotes
the random variable associated with this measure. = {i—k...i...i+1) indexes the
industries which affect the productivity of firms in industry I.
Assumption 2.2. Conditional probability structure of productivity shocks
'Rosenberg[1982] documents many examples of localtechnological
complementarities leading to interternporal spillover effects across industry production
functions. For example, technical change in the early history of the chemical industry
helped trigger innovations in metallurgy and electrical products through the provision of
cheap inputs-"such essential items as refractory materials, insulators, lubricants...and
metals of a high degree of purity."Similarly, David's [1986) discussion of path
dependence shows how the evolution of the typewriter evolved as an element of "a larger,
rather complex system of production that was technically interrelated."Typewriter
operators and producers of typed products jointly interacted in a decentralized, sequential
manner to implement innovations such as keyboard design. As David [1988] has argued,
these findings suggest that economies exhibit nonergodic behavior along many
dimensions.
9A. i4C,I D'_1) = I V.E
B. p(q1,g = I w111_1V iEAk,).
C.The random pairs are mutually independent of each
other VI.
Nomarkets exist whereby individual firms and industries can coordinate
complementarities. Marketsaremissing in two senses. First, there is no mechanism
whereby one industry can be compensated for choosing technique 1 in order to expand the
production sets of other industries. At the same time, since the industries are composed
of many small, distinct producers, firms within an industry also cannot write contracts in
order to act strategically in technique choice. Second, firms cannot be recombined under
under joint management to internalize the complementarities.2 These violations of the
standard Arrow-Debreu assumptions will have an essential impact on the dynamics of the
economy.
In equilibrium, the representative firm makes a choice of the high or low
efficiency technology based upon the level of activity of the complementary industries in
the previous period. For a sequence of date zero prices{pj, each firm possesses an
optimal capital choice level conditional on the technology choice 1 or 2.Denoting
relative prices as= these optimal conditional capital choices, K111 and
respectively, are implicitly defined by the two first order conditions
0f1(K1,1—F,(1 )
1=E(P+I ÔNK I (2.6)
2Thesecond form of missing markets can be replaced by an assumption which
says that managers cannot completely coordinate the activities of sufficiently large
organizations.
101 =E(p1+i ONKtrj. (2.7)
Each firm chooses the maximumof
,1—F,(1)—K1,11 Itr) (2.8)
and
E(pt+1f2(K2 1)—K2, ,I ff). (2.9)
It isclearfrom our assumptions that the production of each firm is higher under
technique 1 than technique 2. In equilibrium, choices of technique I represent greater
capital expenditures in exchange for greater future output.
In order to solve for an equilibrium, we exploit the linear utility specification.
Observe that when consumption is nonzero every period, equalization of marginal rates of
substitution to relative prices means that p1 is proportional to flt, i.e. p1 = j3 V I. Any
other solutions can be ruled out by the transversality conditions associated with the
individual industry and consumer maximization problems. Along this constant relative
price ratio, if firms are maximizing profits, then the marginal rate of substitution will
equal the marginal rate of transformation of capital into output and consumers are
maximizing utility by setting dividends equal to consumption.Consequently, the
existence of an equilibrium can be refonnulated as showing the existence of a set of
optimal firm (and hence industry) production sequences for p1 =
We therefore place an assumption on the relationship between available output
and desired capital which ensures the existence of constant relative prices starting at date
zero, rather than asymptotically. This assumption, which implicitly places restrictions on
both the initial output endowments and the technique-specific production functions,
renders the conditional technique choice probability measures stationary.
11Aumption 2.3.Lower bounds onavailable cap ital3
Forall realizations of(, and q,1, EY11>EK1,1,(fl),where K1,111(i3) fulfills
*— — I — —
1—
ONK
Whenrelative prices are constant, one cancharacterize theconditional
probabilitymeasures over technique choices by all industries at all dates. Thisoccurs
because the history of technique choices is a sufficient statistic for the conditional
probability measures describing the profit maximization problem of eachfirm.
Theorem2.1.Structure of conditionai technique choice probability measures
The equilibnum lechnique choice conditional probability measures for each industry obey
Ili..i)=tt(u1,Iw_1V i eA&,). (2.10)
It is nowstraightforward toverifythe existence of an equilibrium for constant
relative prices. Theorem 2.1 describes theconditionalprobability measures forindividual
technique choices. From thestructure ofthe economy, ifajoint probabilitymeasure
exists overalltechniquechoicesin allperiodswhich is compatible with these conditional
measures, then an equilibrium exists for characterizing capital and consumption decisions.
To see this, suppose that such a measureexists.In this case, an equilibrium
characterization ofthe capital accumulation decisions for all firms over all periods is
implicitly definedsince theindustrytechnique choices simply define a sequence of
3Both Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 can be relaxed without affecting the Theorems
3.1 and 3.2, which constitute the main results of the paper. The assumptions make the
proofs of the Theorems substantially more straightforward.
12production sets for each firm, resulting in capitalchoicesbased on (2.9) and (2.10). As
argued earlier, the resulting consumption sequence from these capital choices is also an
equilibrium for consumers since relative prices equal the marginal rate of substitution.4
Proving the existence of equilibrium is thus equivalent to showing that a set of
conditional probabilities over finite subsets of a stochastic process generates a probability
measure over an entire process. As shown by Theorem 2.1, our assumptions on localized
complementarities ensure that these conditional measures also possess a localized
structure in the sense that conditioning the technique choice on the entire history of the
economy is equivalent to conditioning on a finite number of other elements in the
stochastic process. This implied localized probability structure is generally sufficient to
ensure that a joint measure exists.In one dimension, where the index is normally
thought of as time, the localized structure ensures existence through standard results in
the theory of Markov chains which show how specification of a probability transition
matrix generates a joint measure (see discussions in çinlar ['9751 or Rosenblatt f1971]).
Forourmodel, the set of technique choices are indexed by Z2, the two-dimensional
lattice ofintegers.For stochastic processes whose indices run over several dimensions,
also knownasrandom fields, conditions for the existence of a joint probability measure
have been derived by Dobrushin [1968J. Dobrushin's criteria, when applied to the
industry technique choice probabilities, imply
4Put differently, since the conditional probability measure characterizing
cu1,1,
K1,1 and Y11 obeys p(w11, K,11W11)= p(wjt,Y11,K11 'J.1—1''iE
the existence of a joint probability measure over the technique choices implies there exists
a joint probability measure over capital. and output decisions such that all industries are
maximizing (2.2).
5Our use of Dobrushiri's Theorem allows us to show that an equilibrium exists for
arbitrary initial conditions. When the initial conditions are specified, existence may be
proven using the Kolmogorov Extension Theorem, as the unconditional probability
measures of all finite dimensional sets of elements are now defined. It is natural in this
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AHJSflNITheorem 2.2. Existence of equilibrium
There exists atleast one joint probability measure over all techniquechoices at alldates,
p(Q),whose associated conditional probabilities characterizing time- andindustry-
specific technique choices possess the form given by Theorem 2.1.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical realization of a cross section-time series of Q.
3. Multiple equilibria and long run behavior
We now restrict the conditionalprobabilities in orderto discuss multiplicity and
dynamics. Past choices of technique 1 are assumed to improve the current relative
productivity of the technique. As a result, technique 1 choices will propagate over time.
Further, we assume that w=1 is a steady state, which means that when all productivity
spillovers are active, the effects are so strong that high production is always optimal.
Assumption 3.1. Impact of past technique choices on current technique probabilities6
Let w and w' denote tworealizations of w1.11w1￿ w V j Eà1,then
A.Prob(w1,, =iiw1,1_1 =w5VjE ak,)>Prob(w=iw1,_1 =wViE Ak,,).
B. Prob(w1, =i = 1ViE Ak,,) =1.
Whenever some industry chooses cer= 0,a positive productivity feedback is lost.
Different configurations of choices at i—I determine different production sets and
6This assumption can be reformulated in terms of restrictions on the technique-
specific production functions.
14conditional technique choice probabilities for each industry. We bound the technique
choice probabilitiesfrom below and above by err and err respectively.
er: SProb(w,1=i t— = 0for some jEA ,) err (3.1)
Since w=1 is an equilibrium, multiple equilibria exist if for some initial
conditions, ='failsto emerge as I grows. Notice that even if=0,favorable
productivity shocks will periodically induce industries to produce using technique 1. The
choice of technique 1 by one industry, through the complementarities, increases the
probability that the technique is subsequently chosen in several industries. With strong
spillovers, these effects may build up, allowing g=1 to emerge from any initial
conditions. The model therefore allows us to analyze the stability of a high aggregate
output equilibrium from arbitrary initial conditions.
The stability of w=1 is in fact a function of the transition probabilities which
describe how the economy evolves outside of the high production equilibrium.
Intuitively, this equilibrium is stable from any initial condition if the probability of high
production by an industry independent of all cornplementarities is sufficiently large. In
this case, the spillover effects induced by spontaneous production will cause the economy
to iterate towards the high production limit. This can be seen in the extreme case where
er;=1. Alternatively, if the production probabilities are too low in the absence of
active complementarities, the spillover effects from spontaneous production will be
insufficient to generate momentum towards= 1• Thiscan be seen in the extreme case
where erf'=0.7 For this parameter value, the economy consisting of all low production
technique industries is clearly an equilibrium. The interesting cases for uniqueness and
multiplicity occur when andrrarenot elements of {0,1), as these cases will
7When erft=0, our model reduces to the typical static coordination failure
model where the two equilibria impose homogeneous behavior on all agents and imply
trivial aggregate time series.
15result in nontrivial dynamics. The values of O' and erft place bounds on the degree
of complementarity in the economy.Small values of er?t suggest that
complement.arities are powerful, as the occurrence of high production is extremely
dependent upon the choices of others. Conversely, large values of er!5 mean that
complementarities are weak in the sense that high production frequently occurs even in
the absence of high production by relevant industries in the past.The precise
relationship between the transition probabilities and multiple equilibria is summarized by
Theorem 3.1.Uniquene of long run equilibrium as a function of degree of
corn plemen tarity
For each index set LIkg, with at least one of k or! nonzero, there exist numbers ekl and
k.l'0< k,l < 0k,t <1 suchthat
A. Ife;n ￿ 8k,t'thenimp(w1=1twa=o) =1.
In an economy starting with all low production technique industries, any individual
industry will almost surelyconvergeto the high production technology.
B. If er?t S k,I'then
i.
ii. limj4w1=11w0=0)0.
In an economy starting with all low production technique industries, the probability that
any individual industry achieves high production will be strictly bounded below 1.
Further, the economy will almost surely fail to converge to the high production
16equilibrium.
Further, the range of values of k,I which generates multiple equilibria is
nondecreasing in k and L The greater the number of industries which must act in unison
to ensure that high production is employed with certainty by a given industry, the
smaller the range of parameter values for conditional high production probabilities where
the high production equilibrium emerges. This may be interpreted as saying that high
production outcomes are less likely to emerge as the range of coordination failures
expands.
Theorem 3.2.Relationship between conditional probability bounds and range of
complementaritie.s
Let I(k,)denote the setof values of Qk, which generate multiple equilibria, in the
sense of Theorem 3.1. If Ak, c1m,nthen I(Q&,) c(vn,n)
Consequently, for an arbitrary range of local complemcntaritics, the aggregate
dynamics of the economy are jointly determined by initial conditions and transition
probabilities.These two factors collectively select a long run equilibrium. When
multiple equilibria exist, the transition probabilities do not determine a unique invariant
measure for the system. This property is far more common for random fields than one-
dimensional time series, as discussed in the Technical Appendix.Intuitively, when
economic agents interact along several dimensions, the degree of interdependence between
the agents increases sufficiently to generate multiplicity.
Theorem 3.1 illustrates a dynamic path for economic development. Unlike static
models of industrialization, our framework demonstrates how high levels of production
can emerge endogenously from low production initial conditions. Complementarities can
buitd up across time, leading to a high production long run steady state. This idea
17suggests a resolution of the paradox posed by Scitovaky (1954], on how a railroad that
requires the existence of a steel industry to provide inputs of production and a steel
industry that requires the existence of a railroad to transport materials can ever jointly
develop. When complementarities occur sequentially and when the probability of high
production is still nonzero for an industry even when other industries are inactive,
evolution towards the high production equilibrium can result from the buildup of
complementarities across time.
One can associate w=1 with the equilibrium which would emerge if all firms
chose their production levels cooperatively.If production through technique 1 is
sufficiently large for =i versus any other conilguration, then =i emerges as the
cooperative (and efficient) equilibrium after one period. Consequently, incompleteness of
markets lowers the mean and increases the variance of industry and aggregate output
along the inefficient equilibrium path, as technique choices fluctuate over time. When
industries fail to coordinate, production decisions become dependent on idiosyncratic
productivity shocks.Observe that the volatility associated with the inefficient
equilibrium is caused by fundamentals and is quite distinct from the case where market
incompleteness leads to the emergence of sunspots in aggregate activity.
4. Aggregate dynamics
Our model of interacting industries is capable of producing rich individual
industry and aggregate dynamics.8'9 To better understand the behavior of the aggregate
economy, we consider some simulations for various ranges of industry interaction. In
each simulation, we construct a finite approximation to the infinite economy consisting of
600 industries over 2000 time periods. In all cases, w0 =(I.Output per period by each
industry is normalized to equal 0 or 1.10
We initially consider the case where A10={i—1,i}, which implies the conditional
probability structure




This modelwasoriginally analyzed by Stavskaya and Pyatetskii-Shapiro [1968J.It is
known from simulations reported in that paper, as well as subsequent analytical work,
that the greatest upper bound on errrwhichpermits the inefficient equilibrium to cxist,
is slightly greater than .3, when 01 =0=03.
8The results in the previous section imply that each realization of theeconomy
fails to converge to the invariant measure =i. When°E?'￿ '±'o=Qand er;>0,it follows that each industry i possesses nondegenerate dynamics in the sense
that binsup = 1and lim inf w11 =0almost surely. The first limit is obvious since
there is a positive probability each period that=1.The latter holds, because the
alternative, Jim inf w =1,can hold iff w1=1 after a finite number of periods, which
requires that all elements=C after a finite number of periods, which would
require that all industries which interact with this previous set equal 1 after a finite
number of periods, and so on. This recursion implies that Jim p(çt' =Al ceo = Q)0,
which cannot hold by Theorem 2.3.8. See Shnirman [19Sff'd Vasilyev [1970) for a
more formal argument.
9When there are a finite number of industries, then as t'oo, the high production
equilibrium wilt almost surely emerge. This holds since each period there is a nonzero
probability that all industries will spontaneously choose technique 1.However, a
sufficiently large finite economy can replicate the behavior of the infinite economy for an
arbitrarily large number of periods with arbitrarily high probability. In this sense, a
large finite economy will, for a relevant observable history, appear nonergodic.
'°A {0,1) support for industry output can be justified by generalizing our
assumptions on technology so that =Yif and =








80-Period Sample Rea'ization - 80 Industry Economy
A0
+ = high production by industiy i at
Aggregate output equation
V1 = .09 + .67 '4 + .07 V1,
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Figure 2 displays a sample path realization over the last 80 periods of an 80
industry cross section when the conditional probabilities are=.3,02 =.25and
03 =.2.As the Figure indicates, the economy exhibits considerable cross-section and
intertemporal persistence.Different parts of the economy exhibit disparate behavior.
The average output level over all 500 industries, V, obeys the AR(2)
Vt =.09+ .671'_ + .07Y_2 + (4.2)
The mean value of Y associated with this equation is .35. Recalling that e =.2,the
mean activity level is nearly double that which is predicted by the probability of
production in the absence of active complementarities. The difference between the mean
and the lowest production probability shows how high production choices can spill over
across sectors, building up over time to raise aggregate output.
Figure 3 contains a realization of the behavior of an 80 industry cross section
when the conditional probabilities are 01 =.15,02 =.10and 03 =.05.As the Figure
suggests, the degree of high production bunching is relatively low when assessed either
over a cross-section or over time. This occurs because the probability of production is so
low in the absence of active complementarities that spillover effects do not build up to a
great extent. The average output equation is
11Each regression was computed using the last 1000 observations for all 500
industries of a 2000 period simulation of the economy. Multiple runs produced essentially
the same AR coefficients, suggesting that the low equilibrium measure is unique.
(Results in Vasilyev (1980] show that if the conditional probabilities 01 are small enough,
there is a unique low equilibrium joint measure starting from ceo=O. However, his proof
did not show that any set of Ofs which generate multiple measures will only generate one
measure from w0=O, so we cannot apply his result to our 01 choices.) By using a central
limit theorem argument, one can show that the demeaned Y1's can be normalized to
possess nondegenerate limits as the number of industries becomes unbounded. This will
ensure that the limiting AR representation for the sequence of (normalized) finite
economies is also nondegenerate. See the discussion in Piclcard 11976,19771.
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60-Period Sample Realization - 80 IndustryEconomy
AIM
+ = high production by Industry i at
Aggregate output equatIon












































































80-Period Sample Realization - 80 Industry Economy







V1 = .18 + .49 V1.1 + .07 V,.,
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80= .04+ .25Y_1 + .06Y_2 + c. (4.3)
This equation possesses an unconditional mean of .06, which indicates that the spillover
effects are relatively weak compared to Figure 2.
Our second set of simulations arc constructed based on the interactionrange
a1 1={i—1,i,i+1}. In this case, there are eight different conditional probabilities. We





This structure can be interpreted as saying each complementarity has the same effect on
the production function. Simulations of this structure have shown that the model is
nonergodic when all transition probabilities are below .45.
Figure 4 was generated for the case 0 =.4,02 =.35,03 =.3.The model
exhibits some cross-sectional and intertemporal persistence in fluctuations, but less than
that observed in Figure 2. The associated average output equation is
=.18+ .49Y_ + .OTY_2 + c. (4.5)
Interestingly, the mean of average output, .41, is not substantially greater than 03 =.3.
Certain one-period ahead production occurs only when three industries are simultaneously
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+ = high pitduction by industry i at
Aggregate output equation
'/,.13 + .29 V, + .02 V,.,
C 'an MSIC4 14 Cs Ma I I'Hence, this economy has difficulty in building up active complementarities over time.
Finally we report the behavior of this economy for 01 =.25,°2= .2,
03 =.15.The associated output equation is
=.13+ .29Y_1 + .02Y1_2 + c. (4.6)
which possesses a mean of .19. Again, reduction of the transition probabilities reduces
both the mean and degree of persistence due to the low probabilities of production in the
absence of active complementarities, as evidenced in Figure 5.
These simulations demonstrate how our interacting economy can generate
nondegenerate macroeconomic time series with widely differing degrees of persistence,
depending upon the transition probabilities. The model cannot, however, generate exact
unit roots in output, which have been the subject of so much recent empirical work. This
inability occurs because normalized aggregate output behaves as a stationary L2 process.
Unit roots can emerge in our framework, however, through the introduction of
deterministic technical change which causes the aggregate production set to become
asymptotically unbounded. As described in Durlauf [1990a]1 multiple equilibria can
interact with the evolution of the production set to convert a linear deterministic trend in
potential output into a random walk in realized output.
5. Movement acro equilibria and takeoff
The existence of a low output equilibrium hinges critically ontheprobabilities of
high production in the absence of potential complementarities. When these probabilities
are sufficiently high, then the economy will endogenously evolve towards the high
production state. This feature suggests an interpretation of takeoff to industrialization as
the consequence of increasing the microeconomic decision probabilities of choosing high
production.12
22Technical change is a natural mechanism for introducing evolving probabilities in
technique choice. Two different interpretations exist which can relate technical change to
the simultaneous evolution of conditional technique choices across many industries. One
possibility is that technical change is highly correlated across technologies. II one thinks
of technical change as a multiplicative random walk with drift appended to individual
industry production functions, this would require a great deal of cointegration across
technologies. An alternative possibility is that there exists some common factor which
simultaneously affects many industries. This idea underlies Hirschman's [1958) argument
that the growth of leading sectors such as transportation or steel can stimulate
production throughout the economy due to various demand and supply links between the
leading sectors and other industries.
In order to see how leading sectors can cause the economy to take off, we modify
the model as follows. Let the high production technology take the form
=f1(K1,_i—F,C1,_1,R) (5.1)
where isrepresentative firm i's input of a good produced by a single leading sector.
When industry i employs technique 1, it starts production at 1—1 with a capital
investment and then employs the leading sector input at to produce output at f13
Theleading sector is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. There is free
entry into the industry. At 1—1, the j'ih leading sector firm chooses its level of output at
1, R'71, by choosing a level of capital At Thefirm's production function exhibits
increasing returns due to an overhead capital cost F!1 combined with an exogenous
capacity constraint Theleading sector uses the final good as a capital input.
t2See Kelly 11990] for an interesting analysis of takeoff as resulting from the
formation of economy-wide markets out of an initial localized market structure.
'3Under this timing specification, it is natural to think of the leading sector as
replacing some phase of the production process which would otherwise require a part of
Alternative specifications do not affect the results.
23Without loss of generality, we assume that the production function is linear in capital
anda multiplicativeshift factor —i after subtracting overhead capital.
= 51_1gUC1_1—J1) if￿
= R1otherwise. (5.2)
We assume that the random vector is
independent of V i and that ,,?'and 1'are
elements of
In equilibrium, this sector will produce subject to a no profit condition. In other
words, the date zero price j4'forleading sector output will equal average cost for each
firm in the sector. When demand is large enough, leading sector firms produce at
capacity, which means that the price of leading sector output equals
at—1i1ac
is —w\tircti9 tI 5 3 Pt —
Thefirst order conditions for profit maximization ensure that the relative profitability of
the first technique is increasing in {, increasing inand decreasing in F.
This modification of the technique 1 production functions gives the necessary
structure for providing a role for leading sectors in generating a transition to the high
production equilibrium. Suppose that technical change leads to monotonic rightward
shifts in the distribution functions of .and and a monotonic leitward shift in the
distribution function for it.Inthis case, the conditional probabilities
p(w11=1 Iw-V jE Ak!, fS) (5.4)
will increase across time for all production histories as technical change occurs.'4 If the
24TIME
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Take Off to High-Prociucflon Equilibrium:Average Output
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Uconditional probabilities are sufficiently sensitive to the price of output from the leading
sector, then takeoff can be induced by innovation in the leading sector production
function.
Figures6and 7 exhibit how technical change can lead to rapid growth, by
showinghow asimulatedeconomywill expand as the microeconomic probabilities ofhigh
production increase over time. Each Figure contains a sample path realization for
average production over 500 industries, employing a zero-one normalization for individual
industry output. In Figure 6, all transition probabilities for a A10 economy are started
at= .2 V i. After 25 periods, the probabilities O each grow by .01 per period. This
continues for 30 periods, after which the economy evolves with the new conditional
probabilities O = .5. Figure 7 repeats the expcriment for a A1 Ieconomy.In this case,
the initial probabilities are 0 = .3 and the terminal probabilities are = .6. Both
experiments result in roughly the same S-shaped pattern of growth. In both cases,
growth in aggregate output exceeds .01 per period, the probability parameter growth rate;
both economies converge to the efficient steady state.
This sort of explanation has been applied to the development of the American
economy in the period 1820-1850. North [19661 describes how the early growth of the
American economy led to increased demand for transportation, which in turn stimulated
the construction of canals. Cheaper transportation costs due to canal construction then
stimulated expanded activity in many sectors, including greater agricultural production
and land development. Increased sectoral activity in turn stimulated transportation
demand so that the cycle repeated itsell, leading to substantial increases in aggregate
output.
Technical change arguments cannot easily address the question of movements
from the high to the low production equilibrium. One possibility for explaining shifts to
'4For a wide range of market games, decreasing marginal costs in the leading
sector due to technical change will lead to greater use of the leading sector input at lower
prices by each industry, thereby stimulating high production.
25OIJ = 0•I = 03) — 0
0, = .30 I = 1...25
0,=.30+.O1 (1-25) t=2o...55
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Take Off to High Production Equilibilum: A'. eroge Output
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Ulow productionisto interprettheleadingsector asprovidingfinancialservices and then
tocharacterize a financial collapse as creating effects analogous to a negative shock to
technology. Durlauf (1990b) shows how several of the models of Greenwald and Stiglitz
[1988] on interactions between credit market imperfections and investment can be applied
in this way. In particular fluctuations in the real sector feed into the financial services
sector and thus trigger movements between equilibria.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paperisdesigned to illustrate how incomplete markets and
complementarities can combine to affect aggregate behavior. We have analyzed these
issues in the context of a modified Brock-Mirman stochastic growth model. The basic
results we have shown are three-fold.First, we have shown how long run capital
accumulation and growth may be affected by the interactions of market incompleteness
and complementarities.Technological complementarities combine with incomplete
markets to generate multiple equilibria. These equilibrium paths generate very different
aggregate dynamics from one another. Further, market incompleteness can enhance the
role of idiosyncratic productivity shocks in affecting output decisions and lead to the
propagation of aggregate shocks across time. Second, by proposing a precise way of
measuring the magnitude of technical complementarities, through their effect on
conditional production probabilities, it is possible to link the degree of complementarity
in the economy to the presence of multiple aggregate equilibria. Third, characterizing the
interaction of local and joint complementarities, one may describe how economies shift
across equilibria. This view suggests that leading sectors can act as the trigger for
aggregate development.Methodologically, the paper has employed a probabilistic
characterization of aggregate equilibrium which appears to be a useful language for
describing the dynamics of certain types of coordination failure.
A major limitation of coordination failure and complementarities-based models as
26paradigms for macroeconomic behavior has beentheirinability to address data questions.
Conversely,a great strength of the representative agent/real business cycleparadigmshas
been the direct mapping of these models into aggregate time series. An important goal of
this paper has been to show how complementariLies can produce nondegenerate aggregate
fluctuations. One suspects that further research will show how models driven by
complementarities can generate time series which can be successfully calibrated to US
aggregate data. Unless one is satisfied with establishing an observational equivalence
between the real business cycle and coordination failure approaches, it is clear that an
essential extension of the current paper is the development of empirical tests for
complementarities. Our interacting industries model, like most of the multiple equilibria
literature, embeds complementarities and market incompleteness at a very disaggregated
microeconomic level.Ittherefore appears that the identification of strong
complementarities as a source of aggregate fluctuationswillrequire that
macroeconometrics develops firmer microeconomic foundations.
27Technical Appendix
1. Random field theory
The mathematicsin thispaper, based on random field theory, is new to
macroeconomics. In this section, we try to provide some intuition into this branch of
probability theory. Spitzer [1971) and Griffeath (1976] provide very clear introductions to
the general theory. A randomfieldis any stochastic process made up of individual
elements w,ofsome set Q, where a E A,anindex set. Representative agent economies
can be expressed as random fields by letting the index set equal time, 7'. If the index set
is one of the integer lattices 1', then one can define a local randomfieldas a random field
where the conditional probabilities based upon the rest of the system depend only on
elements distance Daway.
IQWg,) = P("a w6,b—alC D) (A.!.!)
A Markowtandom fieldobeys this structure for D= 1.When one of the dimensions
indexing random variables is time, this definition treats the past, present and future
symmetrically. One can also build up local random fields by conditioning only on the
past.Forexample, letting A= 2, a=(i,t)and employing the partitions fl and
described in the text, a temporally Markov random field over elements Wjmaybe
defined by
p(wI '—i) = I (A.1.2)
whereas alocal,temporally Markov random field may be defined by
it(w1,1I i—r) s4', t I I 6—(r )lD). (A.1.3)
28The economy describedin thetext generalizes this form by allowing an asymmetric range
of interactions.
An important feature of random fields with multidimensional index parameters is
that these processes exhibit interesting forms ol nonergodicity which are absent from one-
dimensional processes. To see this, consider the Markov chain for the time series x with
state space {O,1) and probability transition matrix Q.
';]
The only case where this transition matrix is consistent with more than one invariant
limiting measure for rt is when c = /3 = 1, i.e. Q equals the identity matrix. This would
mean that the time series generated by the process is degenerate.'5 However, for the
multidimensional economies explored above, multiple inyariant measures are consistent
with nondegenerate time series.
The intuition behind this difference is that multidimensional random fields
exhibit a qualitatively different degree of dependence across individual elements than
their one-dimensional counterparts. The only way for the one-dimensional Markov
system to exhibit multiplicity is to force the transition probabilities to equal one, thereby
inducing sufficient dependence across random variables to affect the long run behavior of
the system. This skewing of the transition probabilities is necessary because of the
relatively sparse number of interactions across elements of the stochastic process. We can
see this by contrasting the interactions of x_, and in a Markov chain with the
'51f the state space possesses more than two elements, then it is possible to
construct finite Markov chains which are nonergodic yet produce nondegenerate time





































0000interactions of z,andt 1+2'ina random field corresponding to A1,1 in the text. As
Figure 8 iltustrates, thereis only one path linking the realization ofx_1 to the
conditional distribution of x.2. The effect of x1_ onr2 occurs only through the
intermediaries x and x1+i; generally, Lhe effect of any individual element on future values
of the process decays rapidly. For the random field corresponding to amany (7)
different paths lead to an effect of the realization oft;,_ on the distribution of
These paths are drawn in Figure 9. The number of interconnectionsgrows as the
distance between the elements increases.(The growth in the number of paths is
qualitatively different from what occurs if the dimension i assumes only a finite number
of values.)This large number of interconnections makes the impact of individual
elements on the subsequent history of the stochastic process more persistent. Themany
interconnections in multidimensional systems lead to a substantially greater degree of
dependence across observations than in one-dimensional systems, leading to nonergodicity
and hence multiple equilibria in a rich class of models.
2. Proo of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 2.1.
This Theorem is based upon standard arguments showing that the equilibrium in
the I3rock-Mirman model can be supported by a representative agent economy with price
taking firms. When (and are elements ofwe can define the one-period profit
function, r4,((111,,1) as the value of
max sttp(/3f1(K1 —F,(1 j—K1, flJ2(K1 1)—K1 ). (A.2.1)
Observe that r11((11,q-1) is well-defined.Given our assumptions on the
production function, the timing of information and the size of firms (firms treat the
30technique choices of all industries in the futureas invariant to their choices), it is
straightforwardto show that maximization of (2.2) in the text with respecttothe entire
{K1,}sequence is equivalent tomaximizing (A.2.1) with respect to Kperiodby period,
solong as the solutionto (2.2) is bounded. Boundedness holds for any summable date
zero price sequence by Assumption2.1.Further,concavity of the conditional production
functionsin capital renders the maximum to the profit maximization problem unique.
Hence the profit maximization problem has a solution and an optimal sequence of
technique choices exists.
Clearly, if and are known, then the profitability of each technique is
known as well, which determines the technique choice unless the two techniques are
equally profitable. Assume that all ties are broken by a time invariant rule which is a
function of and i. Recalling the equivalence of the firm and industry technique
choices, by the Continuous Mapping Theorem, w1is a measurable function of these
variables under perfect information. Application of the law of iterated expectations to
the probability measure characterizing w, conditioning for any if_, makes the
optimal capital choice a function of the joint conditional probability measure for ( and
which given Assumption 2.2 yields Theorem 2.1.
Finally, observe that Assumption 2.3 means that the conditional probability
measures characterizing w are identical across iandt, V I ￿ 1.
Proof of Thcorem2.2.
To prove the existence of a joint probability measure for Pt = /3, we verify the
two conditions derived by Dobrushjn [1968] for the existence of a joint probability
measure generated by a given set of conditional measures. First it is necessary to show
that probabilities over all finite sets can be consistently defined. Thismay be seen
through the construction of the conditional probabilities. For any initial condition, it
is possible, given the transition probabilities, to compute p(w11) V i. One can proceed to
31define probabilities based on the individualelements for any finite set in Repeating
thisprocedure, itispossible to assign probabilities for any finiteset in fl. Lettingtoo,
thismeans thatall conditional probabilities over finitesets can beconsistently defined.
The second condition in Dobrushin is that for any finite set Sandany6> 0,
there exists a finitesetofelements, F(S,6), S (S, 6), such that
Is451 1)—p(510,,,—S)￿ 6. (A.2.2)
This condition immediately holds for the probability structure we have examined.
Consider the case S=w1 where the range of interactions is k, Choose the surrounding tras
i:' = {Wp,q such thai0<v—il S k+4 0 c k—ti s k+1}.
Let P be any set of elements such that F' n1'=F'(1 w1 =.Itis clear, given the k
structure,that the conditional probability of any F', given F, is equal to the conditional
probability given F and w1 t•
I w11,F)=p(I"IF) (A.2.3)










I — p(WHIF) =0, (A.2.7)
which shows that (A.2.2) holds for S=w1. Thisargument generalizes to any S, which
proves the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
The proof of (A) is based upon a generalization of a standard argument in
probability theory describing the limiting behavior of percolation models.(Sec
Kindermann and Snell [1980] and Grimmett [1989)fora description.) To show that the
high production equilibrium is attainable from any initial condition, given a sufficiently
high value of err,itis sufficient to provide conditions such that
=I c'o=Q)=O. (A.2.8)
(This limit is equivalent to the probability that w equals 0 if we start theeconomy far
enough back in the past.) The probability that w1 equals 0 is bounded from above by
the probability that at least one of the elements inw11_1, JE Ak,,, equals 0, since if
none of these elements equals 0, w equals 1 with certainty. Each of the elements
is a function of k+l+1elementsof time 1—2.If none of the elements in
JE{i—2k—l...i+21+1}equals 0, then none of the relevant elements can equal 0.
hence, in order to have p(w1=0)0,it is necessary for there to be a path of zeroes
33linking the elements of w1, t—2'j E{i—2k—1...i+21+1) through w_1, IE Ak,to
Making this recursion ittimesleads to (k-i-l+1)" different paths leading from elements at
i—n to Wit.
The probability that any path of length i—i consists of all 0's is bounded from
above by (i_Ø2)t1Consequently,the probability that at least one path of zeroes
leads from Wo to can be bounded from above by the sum of the probabilities of each
of the paths, which implies
= °I=2)￿ (k--l÷1)1—'(l_efl)1--1. (A.2.9)
Iferr>k:t1then the limit of the right hand side is 0 as n=oo, which is the
required result.
The proof of (B) is based upon known results concerning the model for
A110={i—1,i}.Weprove (B.i); the proof for (B.ii) is identical. Let p'/(•) denote the
conditional probability measure of w1for index set A1 and 4.1(.) denote the
conditional probability measure forgiven Ak,,. Shnirman [1968] proves that if
there exists a i.o > 0 such that (B.i) and (B.ii) hold. We can thus assume that for
some
km = 'o = 0) <1. (A.2.10)
In order to show that these properties hold for an arbitrary index set Ak,, it is sufficient
to show that there exists a Qk greater than 0 such that
Iir pj(w1 = ii = 0) c 1. (A.2.1l)
We assume that the conditional probabilities of production under A always equal Q
unless all relevant industries chose technique 1 the previous period, i.e.
34= = fl 1_I=1,u11=0)
= = i = O,w1,_1=1)
= = ii = = 0). (A.2.12)
For any choice of ekEsuchthat
k,1 ￿ 9 (A.2.13)
andany sample path realization of k1 and 10imply
= ii￿ =ii (A.2.14)
The distribution of differs, however, under the two sets of transition probabilities.
The proof is complete once it is verified that the distribution ofw1... is at least as likely
to produce a high production industry under s4:'()thanunder
For each c/, define S, as the set of alt configurationsw such that wc44 V1.
From the assumption on the transition probabilities, (A.2.13), it is clear thatthe
probability of a draw in 2, for w1 is at least as great under pj'°(.)thanunder 4.1(.),
forany c./. This implies
-
EE' =)￿ s4'' EEu,, I= 2). (A.2.15)
Making this argument recursively t—2 times yields
E —,,= Q) ￿ jj(wC E1 I= 2). (A.2.16)
35Choose w' so that '41.11k =1,i—I,0otherwise.This means that S,definesthe set
ofsamplepath realizationsof such that = ij = 1. A subsetofthese
samplepath realizations imply pt'!(w,g =ii =1.hence it is at least as likely that
createsa conditional probability equalling 1 under p'(.) as under
We now can combine three results. First, (A.2.14) shows that conditionalon any
given w1, the probability of w1=l is at least as large for j4'(.)thanany
Second, (A.2.16) states that that the probabitity that the draw of producesa
conditional probability equal to 1 is also at least as large for j4'(.).Third,(A.2.13)
shows that any configuration cg.4 such that the conditional probability ofhigh
production does not equal 1 under p'f(.) generates a conditional probability under
s''?L)thatis at least as great as under j4't(.). Therefore,
=1=Q) =0o =0). (A.2.17)
Taking the limit as i*oo for both sides of this inequality and recalling (A.2.10) gives the
desired result.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
This Theorem immediately follows from the proof of Theorem3.1.
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